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Abstract: We experimentally study the relationship between social norms and social preferences 
on the individual level. Subjects coordinate on injunctive and descriptive norms, and we test which 
type of norm is more strongly related to behavior in a series of dictator games. Our experiment 
yields three insights. First, both injunctive and descriptive norms explain dictator behavior and 
recipients´ guesses, but perceptions about descriptive social norms are behaviorally more relevant. 
Second, our findings corroborate that coordination games are a valid tool to elicit social norm 
perception on the subject level, as the individuals´ coordination choices are good predictors for 
their actual behavior. Third, average descriptive norms on the population level accurately predict 
behavior on the population level. This suggests that the elicitation of descriptive social norms using 
coordination games is a potentially powerful tool to predict behavior in settings that are otherwise 
difficult to explore. 
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• The relationship between social norms and social preferences is examined 
• Both injunctive and descriptive norms explain revealed social preferences 
• Descriptive social norms are more strongly related to social preferences 
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1. Introduction 
Perceptions about social norms influence how individuals interpret social contexts, and they affect 
both intentions and behavior.1 Traditionally, the study of social norms has received less attention 
in economics than in other fields of social sciences, such as sociology (Coleman, 1990; Merton, 
1957) or psychology (Cialdini et al., 1990; Sherif, 1936). During the last decades, however, social 
norms became a vital topic of research in economics (e.g., Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000). By now, it 
is no longer disputed that social norm perception influences economic decisions, for example 
saving rates (Cole et al., 1992), consumer behavior (Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990), financial 
reporting (Dyreng et al., 2012), job search (Stutzer and Lalive, 2004) or energy consumption 
(Allcott, 2011), to name just a few.2 
 Cialdini et al. (1990, 1991) argue that it is essential to differentiate between injunctive and 
descriptive social norms. Injunctive norms indicate perceptions about normatively appropriate 
behavior in a specific context. They reflect what kind of behavior is approved or disapproved by 
the community and thereby motivate actions through the anticipation of social rewards or 
punishment. By contrast, descriptive social norms refer to prevalent or common behavior, and they 
reflect perceptions about the likelihood that others engage in the normative behavior themselves.3 
Experimental studies find that both types of norms explain behavior, but also that the two norms 
are conceptually different constructs that independently affect intentions and behavior (e.g., 
Kallgren et al., 2000; Reno et al., 1993; Rivis and Sheeran, 2003).4 
 There is also research on which type of norm has more explanatory power for actual behavior. 
Some studies argue that injunctive social norms are more influential because they refer to broader 
underlying principles. Therefore, they motivate behavior across a spectrum of situations, while 
descriptive social norms are to a stronger degree context-dependent (e.g., Cialdini et al., 2006; 
Manning, 2009; Reno et al., 1993). It is also argued that descriptive norms are associated with a 
 
 1 We refer to social norms as shared perceptions about behavior. As Crawford and Ostrom (1995) formulate, this 
might be shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted or forbidden. 
 2 As a result of that, the relevance of social norms is also often explicitly considered in economic models of human 
behavior (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). 
 3 Cialdini et al. (1990) summarizes injunctive norms as “norms of ought" and descriptive norms as “norms of is”. 
 4 A large part of studies on the behavioral relevance of social norms is dedicated to pro-environmental behavior (e.g., 
Cialdini et al., 2006; Göckeritz et al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz, 1999; Schultz et al., 
2008; Smith et al., 2012) and health behavior (e.g., Borsari and Carey, 2003; Elek et al., 2006; Larimer et al., 2004; 
Lee et al., 2007; Neighbors et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2011). Typically, behavior rates are highest when injunctive and 
descriptive norms are aligned. 
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boomerang effect (Cialdini, 2003), i.e., that salient descriptive social norms increase, rather than 
decrease, problematic behaviors. Therefore, it has been hypothesized that the manipulation of 
injunctive social norms is a more powerful intervention to affect behavior (e.g., Blanton et al., 
2008). 
 However, there is also ample evidence that the manipulation of descriptive social norms, 
through the provision of information about peers, affects behavior. Changing descriptive norms 
can be powerful because of preferences for conformity (Asch, 1956). Also, the provision of 
information about descriptive norms is potentially effective when subjects tend to overestimate the 
prevalence of problematic behaviors (e.g., Baer and Carney, 1993; Baer et al., 1991; Carey et al., 
2006). Indeed, both lab and field experiments show that the provision of information about peers 
significantly affects behavior in the desired direction (e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Gerber and 
Rogers, 2009; Goeschl et al., 2018; Mair and Bergin-Seers, 2010; Reese et al., 2014). 
 The theoretical and empirical evidence on the competing relevance of injunctive and 
descriptive social norms is inconclusive. One problem with the mentioned evidence is that most 
studies examine aggregate effects of the provision of information or the manipulation of social 
norms. This approach helps to understand the behavioral effect of interventions, which in turn sheds 
light on the competing relevance of different types of norms. However, the approach to examine 
aggregate or treatment effects does only indirectly explain the association between the perception 
of a specific norm and a specific action on the individual level. 
 One important study in that context is Bicchieri and Xiao (2009). They consider Bicchieri 
(2006), who differentiates two types of expectations, that are conceptually related to injunctive and 
descriptive norms. Normative expectations refer to what an individual believes others think she 
ought to do and empirical expectations refer to what an individual expects others to do.5 Bicchieri 
and Xiao (2009) conduct a series of treatments and exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations 
in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. They find that when normative and empirical 
expectations conflict, empirical expectations significantly predict a dictator's own choice, while 
 
 5 Note that, although expectations and social norms are closely related, they are not identical. Instead, according to 
Bicchieri (2006), normative and empirical expectations are a building block for social norms to emerge, including 
norms for fairness, reciprocity or cooperation. 
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normative expectations do not have a significant impact on dictator behavior after controlling for 
empirical expectations. 
 We contribute to this literature by examining under controlled conditions, whether injunctive 
or descriptive social norms elicited using coordination games are more strongly related to social 
preferences measured in a series of dictator games. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit injunctive 
and descriptive social norms from dictators and recipients as well as beliefs about social norms 
held by others.6 That design differs from Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) in three aspects. First, instead 
of eliciting expectations, subjects coordinate on social norms according to the approach proposed 
by Krupka and Weber (2013).7 Second, the subjects´ perceptions are not exogenously manipulated 
through the provision of information beforehand. Third, injunctive and descriptive social norms 
are elicited in a between-subject design, which allows for separately assessing and comparing their 
explanatory power for individual decision-making. 
 Another paper that we relate to is Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016). They also examine 
social preferences and social norms on the individual level, by examining whether revealed 
preferences are driven by heterogeneous sensitivity to social norms. That hypothesis is motivated 
by the observation that differences in payoffs hardly explain behavioral shifts across seemingly 
similar allocation settings (List, 2007). In an experiment, they elicit individual norm-sensitivity and 
relate that measure to actual choices in a series of standard experimental paradigms.8 Their results 
demonstrate that observed behavior is consistent with norm-dependent preferences, i.e., a 
preference per se to obey a social norm, independent from social preferences. They conclude that 
the substantial degree of behavioral variation across contexts does not represent inconsistent 
preferences, but a consequence of the fact that people care about norms and that norms 
fundamentally differ across contexts. 9  We contribute to that analysis by examining whether 
 
 6 By beliefs about social norms held by opponents, we mean that dictators (recipients) state their beliefs about social 
norms held by recipients (dictators). 
 7 In the approach of Krupka and Weber (2013), subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior 
and they have to coordinate on appropriateness ratings. Their approach assumes that social norms are constituted 
through shared perceptions (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), which thereby determine focal points in the coordination 
setting (Schelling, 1960; Sudgen, 1995). Consequently, subjects´ coordination choices reveal perceptions about 
prevailing social norms within. 
 8 Specifically, they examine the public goods game, trust game, dictator game and the ultimatum game. 
 9 As a result of that, social norms are considered to be a potentially powerful tool for nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). For an experimental analysis of using social norms as an instrument to affect behavior via nudging, see Bicchieri 
and Dimant (2019). 
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perceptions regarding the above-described differentiation (injunctive versus descriptive norms) 
better explain variations in revealed social preferences. 
 Finally, our paper is strongly related to the experiment conducted by Krupka and Weber 
(2013). They elicit injunctive social norms regarding behavior in different versions of the dictator 
game, and their results demonstrate that average coordination choices about injunctive norms 
predict behavioral changes between the different versions of the dictator game.10 The analysis that 
we conduct is therefore similar to their analysis, as we attempt to explain changes in revealed social 
preferences by social norm perception elicited using coordination choices, but we differ from their 
experiment in three aspects. First, we do not apply a between-subject design to predict average 
changes across environments. Instead, preferences and norms are measured in a within-subject 
design, and they are related to one another on the individual level.11  Second, we do not use 
variations of the standard dictator game, but a series of varying mini-dictator games.12 Third, 
Krupka and Weber (2013) focus on the predictive power of injunctive social norms. Our 
experimental setup extends that analysis to the measurement of injunctive and descriptive social 
norms. 
 Our results show that both injunctive and descriptive social norms are significantly related to 
dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses on the subject level. Likewise, beliefs about social norms 
of others significantly predict social preferences. Comparing the relative importance of injunctive 
and descriptive norms shows that descriptive norms are significantly more strongly related to social 
preferences on the individual level in almost all specifications. We also conduct aggregate level 
analysis by comparing whether average injunctive or average descriptive norms better predict 
average behavior on the population level. While the relationship between average injunctive social 
norms and average allocation behavior is loose, we observe that average descriptive social norms 
accurately predict average allocation behavior. 
 Three main insights can be drawn from these results. First, perceptions about descriptive social 
norms are significantly more strongly related to social preferences on the individual level, than 
 
 10 Krupka and Weber examine four variants of the dictator game: Dana et al. (2007), Lazear et al. (2012), 
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). 
 11 The approach has already been used to relate coordination choices to decision making on the individual (e.g., Barr 
et al., 2018; Burks and Krupka, 2012; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka et al., 2016). 
 12 Using a series of mini-dictator games allows us to vary distributive motives of allocation behavior (such as the 
degree of efficiency), while this is possible only to a smaller degree in the standard dictator game with fixed pie. 
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injunctive norms. This supports the idea that changing perceptions about prevalent behavior is a 
more fruitful behavioral intervention than changing perceptions about appropriate behavior (e.g., 
Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Second, the paper corroborates that the Krupka and Weber (2013) 
approach is a valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the individual level, as the individuals´ 
coordination choices in both types of norms are strongly related to their actual behavior. This 
indicates that an individual´s coordination choice in that approach represents a good estimator for 
their true perception of social norms.13 Third, comparing the predictive power on the aggregate 
level indicates that average descriptive social norms are good predictors for behavior, while 
injunctive norms are almost unrelated to average behavior rates. This suggests that the elicitation 
of descriptive social norms using coordination games potentially is a powerful approach to predict 
behavior in settings that are otherwise difficult to explore. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the experiment, 
and in section 3, we report the results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
2.1. Experimental Design 
All treatments consist of three stages: an allocation stage, a norm elicitation stage and a belief 
elicitation stage. The allocation stage is identical in all treatments and consists of a series of ten 
mini-dictator games. In the norm elicitation stage, injunctive and descriptive social norms are 
elicited using coordination games (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The norm elicitation stage is varied 
regarding the type of norm and the reference group for coordination, resulting in a 2×2 factorial 
design. In the belief elicitation stage, beliefs about social norms held by others are elicited. Subjects 
earn money in each stage and receive the earnings from one randomly drawn stage at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
 13 Several studies explain why coordination games are suited to reveal a participant´s own perception about the 
question at hand (e.g., Dawes, 1989; Epley et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2019; Vanberg, 2019). This literature shows that, in 
order to successfully coordinate with others, subjects use their own type, when making predictions about the type of 
others (Prelec, 2004). In doing so, they overestimate the degree to which others perceive the question in a similar way 
as they do (Ross et al., 1977). Consequently, an individual´s coordination choice is indicative for her own perception 
about the question at hand. In an experiment on the elicitation of beliefs, Schmidt (2019) finds that coordination choices 
are suited to reveal first-order beliefs about probabilities in an ultimatum game. 
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 Allocation stage: At the beginning of the allocation stage, subjects are randomly assigned to 
the roles of dictator or recipient, and subsequently matched in pairs.14 The dictator´s task is to 
decide in a series of ten mini-dictator games (MDG) how money is divided between herself and 
the recipient (see Table 1). The MDG are designed such that different distributive motives are 
varied between the two options.15 The subjects´ earnings in that stage are determined by the 
dictator´s decision in one randomly drawn MDG. While the dictators make the allocation decisions, 
recipients state their guesses about the dictators´ allocation behavior in each of the ten MDG.16 
 
Table 1. Mini-Dictator Games used in the Allocation Stage 
Decision Option 1 Option 2 Efficiency Egalitarianism Profit 
1 7, 4 5, 5 Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 
2 5, 4 4, 6 Option 2 Option 1 Option 1 
3 6, 4 5, 5 - Option 2 Option 1 
4 6, 3 5, 5 Option 2 Option 2 Option 1 
5 5, 5 5, 6 Option 2 Option 1 - 
6 11, 0 5, 5 Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 
7 5, 0 0, 10 Option 2 Option 1 Option 1 
8 10, 0 5, 5 - Option 2 Option 1 
9 7, 1 5, 5 Option 2 Option 2 Option 1 
10 5, 5 5, 10 Option 2 Option 1 - 
Notes: The numbers represent payoffs in Euro. The first payoff refers to the dictator and the second payoff 
to the recipient. 
 
 Norm elicitation stage: After completing the allocation stage, subjects coordinate on social 
norms regarding dictator behavior in the MDG. Two aspects are varied in a 2×2 between-subject 
design. The first aspect that is varied is the type of norm. In treatments INJUNCTIVE, subjects 
coordinate on injunctive norms. In treatments DESCRIPTIVE, subjects coordinate on descriptive 
norms. Subjects always evaluate option 1 of an allocation decision. For injunctive social norms, 
subjects are asked for each MDG: “How appropriate is it to choose option 1 in the role of dictator?”, 
and they are provided with four answer options: “very appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate”, 
 
 14 In the instructions, the dictator is labeled as “Player A” and the recipient as “Player B”. Subjects are informed that 
they remain in their role throughout the whole experiment. 
 15 Note that the MDG 1-5 correspond to MDG 6-10 in terms of distributive motives. 
 16 Recipients are asked to state their guess about the behavior of the dictator that they are matched with. In order to 
keep the instructions simple, the elicitation of these beliefs is unincentivized. If the recipients´ beliefs were 
incentivized, their payment in that stage would need to be randomly determined either by the dictators´ decisions or 
by the accuracy of the recipients´ beliefs. 
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“somewhat inappropriate” or “very inappropriate”. For descriptive social norms, subjects are asked 
for each MDG: “How many dictators choose option 1 in the role of dictator?”, and they are 
provided with four answer options: “a large majority”, “a majority”, “a minority”, “a small 
minority”. The subjects´ task is to choose the answer option of which they think that it will be 
chosen by the majority of subjects that participate in the coordination game. Subjects that manage 
to pick the modal answer in one randomly drawn MDG earn 10€ in that stage (and zero otherwise). 
 Second, the reference group for coordination is varied. In the current setting, where subjects 
with different roles coordinate on social norms, two variants of coordination are possible. Dictators 
and recipients could either separately coordinate, or they could jointly coordinate on social norms. 
Both variants are applied in the experiment. In the SUBJECTIVE treatments, dictators and 
recipients coordinate only with participants that have the same role as themselves in a session. In 
the OBJECTIVE treatments, dictators and recipients altogether coordinate on social norms. Table 
2 summarizes the 2×2 factorial design of the norm elicitation stage. 
 
Table 2. 2×2 Factorial Design of the Norm Elicitation Stage 
  Reference Group for Coordination 
  Subjective Objective 
 
 
• Treatment: INJUNCTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the appropriate 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients separately 
coordinate on the answers 
• Treatment: INJUNCTIVE_OBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the appropriate 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients jointly coordinate 
on the answers 
 
• Treatment: DESCRIPTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the most common 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients separately 
coordinate on the answers 
• Treatment: DESCRIPTIVE_OBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the most common 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients jointly coordinate 
on the answers 
  
 Belief elicitation stage: After completing the norm elicitation stage, subjects state their beliefs 
about the coordination outcomes of their opponents.17 In the SUBJECTIVE conditions, dictators 
(recipients) state their belief about the coordination outcome of recipients (dictators). In the 
 
 17 The modal choice of participants is considered the coordination outcome. 
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OBJECTIVE conditions, both dictators and recipients state their belief about the modal choice 
made by dictators and by recipients. That is, each subject states her belief about the modal choice 
entered by subjects in the role of dictator and her belief about the modal choice entered by subjects 
in the role of recipient. In the belief elicitation stage, subjects earn 10€ in case of a correct belief 
in one randomly drawn MDG (and zero otherwise). 
 
2.2. Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruitment was done via 
hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Experimental sessions were conducted at 
the experimental laboratories of the University of Heidelberg and the University of Frankfurt (both 
Germany) between June and December 2016.18 In total, 328 subjects participated. Sessions lasted 
about 35 minutes and subjects earned on average 9.01€, including a show-up fee of 4€. Mean age 
was 22.5 years, 56.1% were female, and 32.0% had an economics background in their studies.19 
Table 3 gives an overview of the treatments and the sample. 
 
Table 3. Number of Subjects by Treatment and Location 
Treatment 
Subjects in 
Heidelberg 
Subjects in 
Frankfurt 
Total N 
(Subjects) 
Total N 
(Pairs) 
INJUNCTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 66 18 84 42 
INJUNCTIVE_OBJECTIVE 60 24 84 42 
DESCRIPTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 58 22 80 40 
DESCRIPTIVE_OBJECTIVE 58 22 80 40 
 Σ = 242 Σ = 86 Σ = 328 Σ = 164 
 
 
 
 18 In each treatment, one session was conducted in Frankfurt. The shares of observations collected in Heidelberg and 
Frankfurt is thus constant across treatments (between 21% and 29% per treatment). 
 19 Mann-Whitney-U tests indicate that the two samples do not differ in terms of socio-demographics. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive Results on the Aggregate Level 
To get an impression about social preferences and social norms on the population level, we report 
average behavior in the allocation stage and the norm elicitation stage. We start by analyzing 
allocation behavior of dictators and corresponding guesses of recipients (n = 164 pairs of dictator 
and recipient). Figure 1 shows the share of dictators that chose option 1 in the respective allocation 
decision, and the share of recipients that believed that the dictator matched with them would choose 
option 1. Conducting Mann-Whitney-U tests, we find that items 1, 2, and 5 marginally differ 
between dictators and recipients (p < 0.1). These differences vanish after applying the correcting 
procedure à la Bonferroni.20 The results indicate that recipients are well able to predict allocation 
behavior of dictators.21 This suggests that the two groups have a similar prior regarding actual 
behavior in the given allocation setting, which implies that subjects have a common ground for the 
evaluation of social norms. 
 
Figure 1. Allocation Behavior and Guesses 
 
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of dictators choosing option 1 in the mini-
dictator games, as well as corresponding guesses from recipients. Recipients are asked 
to guess the behavior of the dictator that they are matched with. 
 
 
 20 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect differences between dictators and recipients in that 
test. In order to take care of the inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we therefore multiply the p-values by the 
number of items (i.e., by ten). 
 21 This indicates that the lack of incentivization of recipients in the allocation stage was not a problem for properly 
extracting recipients´ beliefs. 
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 To shed light on the predictive power of elicited norms on the aggregate level, and to compare 
injunctive and descriptive norms in that regard, we conduct simple descriptive analyses.22 Figure 2 
shows the average results from the allocation stage and the norm elicitation stage of the four 
treatments. To graphically depict norms, these are quantified such that the resulting scores are 
normalized between -1 and 1.23 The more positive (negative) the score for injunctive norms, the 
more appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to choose option 1 in the respective decision. The 
more positive (negative) the score for descriptive norms, the more (less) common choosing option 
1 is considered in the respective decision. Likewise, dictator choices and recipient guesses depicted 
in Figure 1 are adapted to that scale.24 
 As can be observed in Figure 2, in all panels the blue lines (average injunctive norm) are rather 
loosely related to the black line (average choice/guess), while the red lines (average descriptive 
norms) are remarkably similar to the black lines. In that simple graphical analysis, we thus observe 
that averages of descriptive norms much better capture the pattern of allocation behavior. This 
applies independently from the reference group for coordination (SUBJECTIVE vs. OBJECTIVE), 
and it applies both for dictators and recipients. 
Result 1. Graphical analysis indicates that descriptive social norms better predict average behavior 
on the population level than injunctive norms. 
 
 
 22 Note that the comparison of social preferences and social norms on the aggregate level is possible only in a 
descriptive manner, since the scales used to measure social norms are verbal. This makes it difficult to compare them 
to behavior rates. Still, the direction in which averages of elicited norms vary when actual behavior varies is a sensible 
comparison in terms of predictive power on the aggregate level. 
 23 Coordination choices are quantified as follows. For injunctive norms: 1 = ”very appropriate”, 1/3 = ”somewhat 
appropriate”, -1/3 = “somewhat inappropriate”, -1 = “very inappropriate”. For descriptive norms: 1 = ”a large 
majority”, 1/3 = ”a majority”, -1/3 = “a minority”, -1 = “a small minority”. Note that subjects always evaluate the 
choice of option 1. 
 24 For that sake, option 2 is coded with the value -1 instead of 0 (as in Figure 1). 
11 
 
Figure 2. Averages of Allocation Behavior and Social Norms 
Panel A. Subjective Dictator Norms Panel B. Objective Dictator Norms 
  
Panel C. Subjective Recipient Norms Panel D. Objective Recipient Norms 
  
Notes: “Choice” indicates allocation behavior of dictators, and “Guess” indicates the recipients´ guesses about dictator 
behavior. In “Choice” and “Guess”, option 1 is coded as “1”, and option 2 is coded as “-1”. 
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3.2. Individual Level Analysis 
We proceed by analyzing the relationship between social norm perception and social preferences 
on the individual level.25 For that sake, we regress the choices from the allocation stage on the 
choices made in the norm elicitation stage.26 In Table 4, we analyze dictator choices, and in Table 
5, we analyze recipient guesses about dictator choices. panels A of these tables refer to elicited 
injunctive norms, and panels B refer to elicited descriptive norms. Regression analyses are 
conducted with (i) a Probit-model and (ii) an OLS-model.27 
 We find that, in each specification, the regressor that refers to elicited norms (“Injunctive 
Norm” in panels A and “Descriptive Norm” in panels B) is statistically significant, independent 
from the regression model. This holds in either treatment condition SUBJECTIVE and 
OBJECTIVE, and it holds for both types of social norms. We interpret this as evidence that 
injunctive and descriptive norms elicited in the norm elicitation stage are related to social 
preferences measured in the allocation stage. 
Result 2. Both injunctive and descriptive social norms are statistically significantly related to 
dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator behavior. 
 We proceed by comparing whether injunctive or descriptive norms are more strongly related 
to choices in the allocation stage. For that sake, one needs to column-wise compare the regressions 
contained in Table 4 and Table 5. We find that the size of the p-values of the relationship between 
descriptive norms and allocation behavior (contained in panels B) is smaller in all specifications 
than the corresponding p-values for injunctive norms (contained in panels A). This holds for all 
specifications that refer to dictators (Table 4) and to all specifications that refer to recipients (Table 
5). This indicates that social norms elicited in the DESCRIPTIVE treatments are more strongly 
related to social preferences than social norms elicited in the INJUNCTIVE treatments. In order to 
test whether these differences are statistically meaningful, we conduct regression analyses with 
interaction terms. We first pool the observations from the conditions INJUNCTIVE and 
 
 25 For simplicity, we refer to “social preferences” as choices made in the allocation stage, i.e., actual dictator choices 
as well as recipients´ guesses about dictator choices. 
 26 We code the decisions made in the allocation stage by a dummy variable which takes a value of “1” if a dictator 
chooses option 1 in a MDG (and “0” for option 2). Respectively, the dummy indicates that a recipient´s guess in a 
MDG is that the dictator chooses option 1. In the norm elicitation stage, the evaluation of injunctive and descriptive 
norms is coded as in the analyses on the aggregate level in section 3.1. 
 27 We employ a Probit-model in order to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable. The OLS-regressions 
serve as robustness checks. 
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DESCRIPTIVE. Then, we perform the same analysis, i.e., we regress allocation behavior on norm 
perception, but we add an interaction term between (i) the variable that indicates norm perception 
and (ii) a dummy that indicates whether that norm was elicited in the INJUNCTIVE or the 
DESCRIPTIVE condition of the respective treatment.28 The interaction term yields a significance 
test about whether the relationship between the norm choice and the choice made in the allocation 
stage is statistically significantly different between injunctive and descriptive norms. 
 As can be seen in panels C of Table 4 and Table 5, the interaction term is positive and 
significant in all specifications, i.e., both for dictator behavior and recipient guesses about dictator 
behavior (again independent from the regression model). We interpret this as evidence for 
descriptive social norms being more strongly related to behavior in the allocation stage, than 
injunctive norms. 
Result 3. Descriptive norms are statistically significantly more strongly related to dictator behavior 
and recipients´ guesses about dictator behavior than injunctive norms. 
 
 
 28 The dummy takes a value of 0, if the norm is injunctive, and a value of 1, if the norm is descriptive. 
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Table 4. Social Norms and Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
  
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.488*** 
(0.162) 
0.169*** 
(0.056) 
 
0.418*** 
(0.135) 
0.136*** 
(0.044) 
Constant 
1.336* 
(0.811) 
0.944*** 
(0.272) 
 
-0.330 
(0.686) 
0.414* 
(0.232) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.042*** 
(0.180) 
0.367*** 
(0.051) 
 
1.240*** 
(0.157) 
0.401*** 
(0.041) 
Constant 
1.092 
(0.913) 
0.854*** 
(0.292) 
 
-1.168 
(0.800) 
0.188 
(0.225) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Norm 
0.495*** 
(0.163) 
0.171*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.412*** 
(0.133) 
0.136*** 
(0.044) 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.521** 
(0.243) 
0.187** 
(0.076) 
 
0.820*** 
(0.215) 
0.262*** 
(0.061) 
Constant 
1.611*** 
(0.594) 
1.043*** 
(0.196) 
 
-0.302 
(0.507) 
0.453*** 
(0.157) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. 
Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Dictator 
Choice” is a dummy variable that indicates whether dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all 
regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory 
(Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment 
condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the 
same results. 
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Table 5. Social Norms and Recipient Guesses about Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
  
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.641*** 
(0.131) 
0.211*** 
(0.043) 
 
0.625*** 
(0.140) 
0.206*** 
(0.042) 
Constant 
0.722 
(1.059) 
0.770** 
(0.371) 
 
-1.352 
(0.949) 
0.081 
(0.277) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.366*** 
(0.211) 
0.402*** 
(0.049) 
 
1.292*** 
(0.167) 
0.417*** 
(0.034) 
Constant 
0.341 
(0.630) 
0.571*** 
(0.174) 
 
0.260 
(0.442) 
0.595*** 
(0.118) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Norm 
0.573*** 
(0.137) 
0.184*** 
(0.044) 
 
0.618*** 
(0.133) 
0.206*** 
(0.040) 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.656*** 
(0.234) 
0.212*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.691*** 
(0.214) 
0.215*** 
(0.053) 
Constant 
0.419 
(0.604) 
0.663*** 
(0.190) 
 
0.211 
(0.473) 
0.595*** 
(0.139) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. 
Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable 
“Recipient Guess” is a dummy variable that indicates whether recipients believe that dictators choose option 1 
in a mini-dictator game. In all regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the 
experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also 
control for the treatment condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit 
regressions and find the same results. 
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3.3. The Relationship between Beliefs about Social Norms and Social Preferences 
We continue by analyzing the relationship between beliefs about social norms and social 
preferences. We conduct the same analysis as in the previous sections, but instead of using data 
from the norm elicitation stage, we use the data from the belief elicitation stage. Remember that 
the belief elicitation stages do slightly differ between the SUBJECTIVE and the OBJECTIVE 
conditions. In the SUBJECTIVE conditions, dictators (recipients) state their beliefs about the modal 
choices of recipients (dictators) in the norm elicitation stage. In the OBJECTIVE conditions, all 
subjects (i.e., independent from their roles) state their beliefs about the modal choices of both 
dictators and recipients. In Table 6, we analyze beliefs from dictators, and in Table 7, we analyze 
beliefs from recipients.29 As in the previous section, panels A of these tables refer to injunctive 
norms, panels B refer to descriptive norms, and panels C contain the combined data with interaction 
terms. 
 The separate analyses in panels A and panels B show the same general pattern as observed in 
the previous section. In most of the specifications, beliefs about injunctive and descriptive norms 
are significantly related to allocation behavior of dictators (Table 6) and to recipient guesses about 
allocation behavior (Table 7). However, the relationship between behavior in the allocation stage 
and beliefs about norms is less strong than the relationship between behavior in the allocation stage 
and actual norms. 
Result 4. In most of the specifications, beliefs about injunctive and descriptive social norms are 
statistically significantly related to dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator 
behavior. 
 Again, we compare whether the relationship between social preferences is stronger with beliefs 
elicited in the INJUNCTIVE or the DESCRIPTIVE conditions in panels C of Table 6 and Table 7. 
Though the results are less clear than in the previous section, the general pattern is identical. 
Specifically, most of the interaction terms are positive, and the majority of them are statistically 
significant. This indicates that beliefs about descriptive social norms are more strongly related to 
allocation behavior than beliefs about injunctive social norms. 
 
 29 Table 6 and Table 7 are contained in the appendix, in order to increase the content-to-space ratio of the paper. The 
analyses are, however, fully equivalent to the analyses conducted in tables 4 and 5, except that the choices from the 
allocation stage are not regressed on the data from the norm elicitation stage, but on the data from the belief elicitation 
stage. 
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Result 5. In most of the specifications, beliefs about descriptive norms are statistically significantly 
more strongly related to dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator behavior than 
beliefs about injunctive norms. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
We study the relationship between social norms and social preferences in a series of dictator games. 
Subjects first undergo an allocation stage where dictators decide about the division of money, and 
recipients state their beliefs about the behavior of dictators. Subsequently, subjects evaluate 
allocation behavior, by coordinating on injunctive and descriptive social norms as proposed by 
Krupka and Weber (2013). Finally, both types of players state their beliefs about the coordination 
outcomes of their opponents. We find that both injunctive and descriptive norms are significantly 
related to dictator behavior and recipients´ beliefs about dictator behavior. Likewise, beliefs about 
social norms held by others significantly predict social preferences. Comparing the relative 
importance of injunctive and descriptive norms shows that descriptive norms are significantly more 
strongly related to social preferences in almost all specifications. 
 The paper yields three contributions. The first contribution refers to the literature on the 
relative importance of different types of social norms as determinants of behavior. While there is 
mixed evidence on whether injunctive or descriptive social norms are more related to individual 
decision making, our paper supports the hypothesis that the explanatory power of perceptions about 
descriptive social norms is behaviorally more relevant than perceptions about injunctive social 
norms. Apparently, the analysis of this paper does not identify causal effects of injunctive or 
descriptive norm perception on actual behavior. However, in line with Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), 
the results support the view that changing perceptions about prevalent behavior is a more fruitful 
behavioral intervention than changing perceptions about appropriate behavior. 
 The second contribution is methodological, as the paper provides a direct test on the 
informativeness of coordination choices à la Krupka and Weber (2013) as a measure for social 
norm perception on the individual level. Our results suggest that individual coordination choices 
are a valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the subject level, as the participants´ coordination 
choices are significantly related to their actual behavior. In line with previous studies, this supports 
the idea that predictions about others are informative about a subject´s own perception about the 
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question at hand (Dawes, 1989; Epley et al., 2004; Ross et al., 1977; Schmidt, 2019; Vanberg, 
2019), i.e., in this case about the own perception about prevailing social norms. This enlarges the 
potential scope of the Krupka and Weber (2013) method, as it indicates that not only the aggregate 
outcome of elicited norms is suited to predict behavioral changes across contexts on the group 
level. Instead, a subject’s coordination choice also explains behavioral changes across different 
contexts on the individual level. 
 The third contribution is again methodological. Although the experiment is designed to 
investigate the relationship between social preferences and social norms on the individual level, 
we conducted descriptive analyses on the aggregate level. For that sake, we compared average 
outcomes from the social preference tasks with average behavior from the tasks where subjects 
coordinate on injunctive and descriptive social norms. While the relationship between average 
injunctive social norms and average allocation behavior is rather loose, average descriptive social 
norms accurately predict average allocation behavior. That observation is particularly remarkable 
as the scale used to measure social norms is verbal, because it was not the focus of the elicitation 
of descriptive norms to extract accurate estimations about behavior rates, which could then serve 
as a prediction device. That result supports the idea from Krupka and Weber (2013) to use social 
norms elicited using coordination games as device to predict how behavior changes across 
environments. In fact, our data suggest that coordination games are not only suited to make 
prediction about shifts in behavior but to make point predictions about precise behavior rates. This 
is particularly appealing to predict behavior in contexts that are otherwise difficult to explore. We 
hope that further experiments are conducted to follow up on that observation and to examine 
coordination games as a tool to predict behavior, both on the individual and the aggregate level. 
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Appendix 
Table 6. Beliefs about Social Norms and Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Beliefs about Injunctive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
  
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.173 
(0.165) 
0.060 
(0.055) 
 
0.582*** 
(0.145) 
0.193*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.298** 
(0.138) 
0.098** 
(0.044) 
Constant 
1.325 
(0.857) 
0.964*** 
(0.294) 
 
-0.657 
(0.643) 
0.310 
(0.215) 
 
-0.310 
(0.685) 
0.411* 
(0.235) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Beliefs about Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Descriptive 
Norm  
0.048 
(0.148) 
0.019 
(0.058) 
 
1.684*** 
(0.161) 
0.489*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.103 
(0.153) 
0.040 
(0.055) 
Constant 
0.777 
(0.857) 
0.805** 
(0.336) 
 
-1.882** 
(0.820) 
0.061 
(0.180) 
 
-1.039 
(0.756) 
0.111 
(0.271) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Beliefs about Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Norm 
0.171 
(0.161) 
0.059 
(0.054) 
 
0.558*** 
(0.137) 
0.186*** 
(0.044) 
 
0.298** 
(0.136) 
0.100** 
(0.043) 
Belief 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
-0.121 
(0.217) 
-0.040 
(0.078) 
 
1.120*** 
(0.207) 
0.306*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.201 
(0.204) 
-0.062 
(0.069) 
Constant 
1.215** 
(0.601) 
0.945*** 
(0.218) 
 
-0.750 
(0.491) 
0.351** 
(0.136) 
 
-0.438 
(0.506) 
0.342* 
(0.175) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. Standard 
errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Dictator Choice” is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all regressions, we control 
for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the 
regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a 
further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the same results. 
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Table 7. Beliefs about Social Norms and Recipient Guesses 
Panel A. Beliefs about Injunctive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
  
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.356** 
(0.161) 
0.130** 
(0.058) 
 
0.680*** 
(0.167) 
0.232*** 
(0.054) 
 
0.564*** 
(0.168) 
0.188*** 
(0.050) 
Constant 
0.156 
(1.170) 
0.581 
(0.426) 
 
-1.773* 
(0.997) 
-0.052 
(0.296) 
 
-0.996 
(0.936) 
0.179 
(0.286) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Beliefs about Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.395*** 
(0.195) 
0.416*** 
(0.041) 
 
1.289*** 
(0.160) 
0.416*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.824*** 
(0.144) 
0.292*** 
(0.043) 
Constant 
0.592 
(0.679) 
0.640*** 
(0.187) 
 
0.532 
(0.433) 
0.686*** 
(0.133) 
 
0.175 
(0.438) 
0.566*** 
(0.146) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Beliefs about Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Norm 
0.281* 
(0.154) 
0.106* 
(0.055) 
 
0.654*** 
(0.167) 
0.227*** 
(0.054) 
 
0.581*** 
(0.160) 
0.193*** 
(0.048) 
Belief 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.999*** 
(0.226) 
0.308*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.619*** 
(0.231) 
0.185*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.263 
(0.213) 
0.105 
(0.063) 
Constant 
0.321 
(0.654) 
0.634*** 
(0.212) 
 
0.330 
(0.478) 
0.614*** 
(0.158) 
 
0.312 
(0.405) 
0.610*** 
(0.135) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. Standard 
errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Recipient Guess” is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether recipients believe that dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all 
regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or 
Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment condition (injunctive or 
descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the same results. 
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